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Abstract - This paper estimates cost efficiency and returns to scope of  Italian investment firms during 
the period 1998−2002, following the stochastic frontier function approach. Results indicate a large 
inefficiency for Italian investment firms (with a high standard deviation across sample) and the absence 
of significant returns to scope. 
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  I n t r o d u c t i o n
Investment ﬁrms1 In Italy in the last ﬁfteen years have ampliﬁed their impor-
tance in the ﬁnancial industry and have had an increasing role in ﬁnancial
markets, particularly in stock and bond markets. In this scenario it is impor-
tant to measure the economic performances and the eﬃciency of investment
ﬁrms, since economic eﬃciency is a general notion that can involve diﬀerent
aspects and characteristics of ﬁrms’ activity. It is common to evaluate the
economic performances of investment ﬁrms using balance sheet ratios such
as: operating costs over gross revenue, return on equity (ROE), return on
assets (ROA), expense to premium ratios, etc. However, over the last several
years, a great number of studies has been conducted in which the economic
eﬃciency of investment ﬁrms has been evaluated by estimating their eﬃ-
cient economic frontier functions.2 Among economic frontier methodologies
it is possible to distinguish between deterministic (non-parametric) frontier
functions and stochastic (parametric) frontier functions.
The deterministic approach to the measurement of eﬃciency, i.e., the
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA henceforth), due to Farrell (1957), deﬁnes
a frontier envelopment surface for all sample observations following a math-
ematical programming model. All the ﬁrms that do not lie on the frontier
are ineﬃcient; it is possible to calculate the individual score of ineﬃciency
by measuring the distance from the frontier, as well as each ﬁrm’s pier(s).
By using DEA it is possible to deﬁne a benchmark of excellence (the eﬃcient
ﬁrm(s)) with respect to which evaluate all the other ﬁrms in the sample.
The DEA does not imply any restriction about the functional form of fron-
1With the term "investment ﬁrms" we denote Italian banks and non-banks whose
main activity is trading and asset management, associated in the Italian ASSOSIM. For a
deﬁnition of the industry see the European Directive n.93/22/CEE or the ASSOSIM web
site.
2The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. For a survey, see Amel et al. 2002.
1tier functions. However, it is very sensitive to model-speciﬁcation errors and
it tends to become inaccurate with small samples since it assumes that there
is no random error in the data. Moreover, it misrepresents those variations in
outputs or inputs that are due to external and uncontrollable factors since (by
assumption) it ascribes all deviation from the eﬃcient frontier to ineﬃciency.
The stochastic frontier function approach (SFF, henceforth) requires the
speciﬁcation of the functional form and some assumptions about the error
terms, but it leaves room to error in measurement and random factors that
explain changes in inputs and/or outputs. SFF does not input all the dis-
tance from the eﬃcient frontier to ineﬃciency, since it distinguishes core
ineﬃciency from random error. It has contributed to extend the range of
eﬃciency analysis by considering economies of scale and scope (given the set
of technologies).3
E v e ni ft h e r ei sag e n e r a la g r e e m e n ta b o u tt h ee x i s t e n c eo fal a r g ei n -
eﬃciency in the ﬁnancial industry the dimension of ineﬃciency reported in
various studies diﬀers widely (see Berger and Mester, 1997). Diﬀerences in
the eﬃciencies of ﬁnancial institutions seem to depend on: discrepancy in
the concept of eﬃciency used, dissimilarity in methods of measurement, ex-
istence of correlates of eﬃciency, such as exogenous environmental variables.4
Notwithstanding the divergences in estimated eﬃciencies and the dependence
from exogenous variables, frontier eﬃciency methodologies have made the
standard methods based on ratios to evaluate the economic performances of
investment ﬁrms at least complemental.
In this paper investment ﬁrms’ eﬃciency is considered; neither interna-
tional nor intersectorial comparison is examined. Following the SFF ap-
proach, the paper estimates the core eﬃciency of investment ﬁrms without
deﬁning a benchmark of excellence, in order to highlighting if ﬁrms’ over-
3See Kalirajan and Shand (1999) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004)
4See Becalli (2003).
2all performances are adequate with respect to the realization of their own
potentials. Cost eﬃciency is estimated, which refers to the problem of cost
minimization, i.e., the optimal allocation of inputs given their prices. In order
for a ﬁrm to be cost-eﬃcient it must equal the marginal value product of an
input to its marginal cost. By estimating the distance between the observed
production’s cost and the theoretically correct one that lays along the eﬃ-
cient isoquant, the stochastic measure of cost eﬃciency expresses both purely
technical eﬃciency and allocative eﬃciency. Moreover, returns to scope5 are
considered too, in order to identify the proﬁtability of joint production. This
is particularly interesting since mergers and acquisitions in ﬁnancial industry
are commonly justiﬁed by the need of exploiting scope economies.6
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the stochastic cost function
is deﬁned and discussed. Section 3 reports data and comments. In section 4
cost eﬃciencies are estimated and the results are analyzed. In section 5 the
returns to scope are modelled and evaluated. Concluding remarks follow in
section 6.
1 Sto chastic cost frontier functions
We estimate eﬃciency following the stochastic frontier function approach. A
SFF assumes the following form:
5Returns to scope refer to the superadditivity of the production function while
economies of scope denotes the subadditivity of cost function.There exists, under some
mild assumptions, a biunivocal correspondence between the two concepts because of cost-
production duality (Baumol et al., 1982, Theorem p.62). However, this is true only under
the hypothesis of optimization, i.e., revenue maximization or cost minimization, which im-
plies full eﬃciency. Since our aim is to test ineﬃciency we cannot assume it; this implies
that the duality of cost subadditivity - production superadditivty ceases to hold.
6Again, for a survey, see Amel et.al. (2002).
3yi = βxi + vi − ui (1)
where yi is the log of ﬁrm’s i dependent variable, xi is the vector of ex-
plicative variables, β is the (row) vector of estimands, vi is a random error
which accounts for measurement errors and random factors and ui is the in-
eﬃciency parameter. The latter is supposed to be distributed according to
a µ−truncated normal distribution, i.e., it is obtained by the truncation at
zero of a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. It is estimated
following a maximum likelihood iterated procedure7 that provides an esti-
mation of the average eﬃciency. Moreover, values of µ are compounded; the
ratio of standard deviation for u and v is calculated as γ = σ
σ2+σ2
v,w h i c h
provides an estimate of random (i.e. non-technical) ineﬃciency eﬀects; the
eﬃciency estimates of each ﬁrms are obtained as:
E(ui|ei)=












γ(1 − γ)(σ2 + σ2
v); ei =( yi −βxi) and Φ(·) is the distribution
function of the standard normal random variable.
A stochastic cost function is analyzed, assuming a translog speciﬁcation.
More precisely, we adopt the following speciﬁcation for the stochastic cost
function:
lnCi = b0 + b1 lnPLi + b2 lnPKi + b3 lnQi + 1
2[b4 lnP2
Li + b5 lnP 2
Ki + b6 lnQ2
i]
+b7 lnPLi lnPKi + b8 lnPLi lnQi + b9 lnPKi lnQi + vi − ui
(3)
where PLi is the price of labour of ﬁrm i, PKi is its price of capital, Qi is
the output of ﬁrm i and Ci is ﬁrm’s i total cost.
7w h i c hc a nb er u nu s i n ga n ys p e c i ﬁc software package such as the computer program
Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1996).
4The introduction of the translog function is due to Jorgenson et al. (1973)
that use a second-order Taylor expansion in natural logarithms as an approx-
imation of an unknown function. The translog form has been chosen because
of its ﬂexibility of the assumptions.8
2T h e D a t a
T h ed a t au s e dh e r ea r ed e r i v e df r o mﬁnancial statements of the Italian in-
vestment ﬁrms associated in Associazione degli Intermediari Immobiliari9
(ASSOSIM). The sample consists of 242 observation (balance sheet of in-
vestment ﬁrms) for the period 1998 − 2002.10 Labour and capital costs are
directly obtained by manipulation of ﬁnancial statements of each investment
ﬁrm. Capital, in particular, is compounded grouping all operating expenses
less labour and interest expenses and it includes passive commissions. These
are brokerages paid in order to acquire from other intermediaries some of ﬁ-
nancial services that investment ﬁrms sell to their customers (mainly foreign
assets’ negotiation). Therefore, it can be interpreted as one of the capital
inputs that are used to produce the speciﬁc output "ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion" dealt by investment ﬁrms. Price of labour and capital is deﬁned as the
total labour cost over the total number of employees (average salary) and
the total cost of capital over the total ﬁxed assets (average cost of capital),
respectively.
The choice of the appropriate measures for the above-mentioned vari-
ables is not problematic; it is more diﬃcult to deﬁne clearly what investment
8Vantages and disvantages of using a translog forms are discussed in Cummins and
Weiss (1998).
9We have excluded from the sample those universal banks associated with the ASSOSIM
for which it is impossible to obtain disaggregated data about their ﬁnancial activities.
10The panel is unbalanced due to the processes of entry, exit and merges during the
period of observation.
5ﬁrms’ outputs are and ﬁnd the appropriate proxy to measure them. We can
broadly identify three main typologies of their activities, given that they can
exploit proﬁts following three main roads; indeed, they can: i) deal to cus-
tomers their ﬁnancial intermediation services (intermediation activity, which
includes trading and order routing, primary market activities and asset man-
agement); ii) manage their own portfolio of participations and assets; iii)
exploit diﬀerences between active and passive interests in savings and de-
posits accounts ("interest margin").
While all three types of activity generate ﬁrms’s revenues, the former is
the most interesting variable to focus on in order to measure the activity of
ﬁnancial markets’ intermediation performed by investment ﬁrms since it is
an activity performed "on demand", i.e., it depends on the ability of each
ﬁnancial ﬁrms to cope with the market.11 We therefore use data about
intermediation to represent the typical investment ﬁrms’ outputs.12
There is another advantage of focusing on these data. The intermedia-
tion activity placed upon order is made of three main typologies, namely,
brokerage of securities and currencies, primary market activity and asset
management.13 Figures of active and passive commissions can be disaggre-
gated into i) active and passive brokerage of securities and currencies; ii)
active commissions accruing from primary market activity; iii) active and
passive commissions stemming from asset management.14 Therefore, by fo-
cusing on intermediation we can compute estimates of eﬃciency related to
11Moreover, revenues accruing from the other two activities are marginal.
12Other studies (Beccalli 2003) have compared (cost) eﬃciency using diﬀerent proxies
for revenues, and found that there are no signiﬁcant variation between estimates obtained
using diﬀerent measures of output.
13There is a fourth residual category that groups commissions accruing from several
other minor services dealt to customers such as marketing and advisory, stock holders’s
rights management, dividends distributions and similar. We call it "various".
14Notice, however, that it is not possible to acquire disaggregated data about costs and
prices of each activity.
6each typology of activity and use them to test for the existence of returns to
scope within all the components of the intermediation activity.
Table 1 reports aggregate yearly data of variables used for our estimates
as well as other aggregates useful for comparisons, and yearly percentage
changes. Overall revenues from ﬁnancial intermediation (Q henceforth) in-
crease from year 1998 to year 2000,w h e nt h e yr e a c h38,209,033 euros; then
they decrease in the following years down to 27,330,047 euros in year 2002.
On the contrary total costs (TC) increase continuously from 14,707,965 eu-
ros to 35,044,029 euros. The ratio of the former over the latter, i.e., Q/TC
decreases from 1.469 in year 1998 to 0.689 in year 2002, showing a worsening
of investment ﬁrms performances.15 It is worth noticing that the decrease in
Q/TC derives from the two diﬀerent dynamics of total costs excluding pas-
sive commissions (TC1), and passive commissions (PC). TC1 increase from
11,409,913 euros (1998)t o28,001,670 euros (2002), and the ratio Q/TC1
decreases from 1.894 in year 1998 to 0.976 in year 2002.M o r e e v i d e n t i s
the increase in costs deriving from passive commissions, that boost from
3,298,052 euros at the beginning of the sample period to 11,675,519 eu-
ros at the end of the period; the ratio Q/PC decreases from 6.552 in year
1998 to 2.341 in year 2002. Labour cost increases from 5,478,648 euros to
11,607,871 euros, with an increasing trend but with two diﬀerent dynamics:
a very steep one up to year 2000, a n da na l m o s tﬂat increase thereafter (+6%
in year 2001 and +7% in year 2002). The price of labor increases up to year
2000, when it reaches a maximum of 114,721 decreasing thereafter down to
99,712 euros in the last year of observation.
It is dramatically evident that the worsening of investment ﬁrms’ perfor-
mances is due to the abnormal growth of PC. The evolution over time of
PC shows an increasing trend with respect to the relative reduction of other
15Notice moreover that from year 2001 onward overall revenues from ﬁnancial interme-
diation do not cover total ﬁrms’ costs.
7costs, such as labour, whose dynamic is completely ineﬀective and it only
mitigates the critical eﬀects on proﬁtability.
[Insert table 1 here]
Table 2 shows average data of active and passive commissions disaggre-
gated into brokerage (of securities and currencies), primary market activity
and asset management. Active commissions show that the mean is twice as
much as the median, putting in evidence that a large part of ﬁrms have a
small dimension. The disaggregate analysis of active commissions shows that
investment ﬁrms’ core business is represented by brokerage and primary mar-
ket activity, while asset management is residual. Passive commissions put in
evidence that investment ﬁrms have a diﬀerent attitude with respect to the
possibilities of acquiring ﬁnancial products dealt by other institutions. The
mean is seven times the median and the standard deviation is three times
t h em e a n ;i ti st h e r e f o r ep o s s i b l et oi n f e rt h a tp a s s i v ec o m m i s s i o n sa r em o r e
weighed for large and very large ﬁrms. The main component among passive
commissions are payments for brokerage of securities and currencies. In this
case the analysis might suggest that investment ﬁrms (even the larger ones)
face strong barriers to entry into foreign markets (which are increasing over
time) which not only put their balance under pressure but looms on their
ability to stay in the international ﬁnancial markets.
[Insert table 2 here]
3A v e r a g e E ﬃciencies
Results of the estimates of cost eﬃciencies indicate the existence of quite large
mean ineﬃciencies. Table 3 reports average cost eﬃciencies of investment
ﬁrms for years 1998 − 2002.
[insert table 3 here]
The values of γ show that almost all the ineﬃciency is to be attributed to
8internal factor rather than to random events. The ﬁgures of µ demonstrate
that the choice of a µ−truncated normal distribution is to be preferred to
the normal truncated one. The overall goodness of choice of our speciﬁcation
is conﬁrmed by the ﬁgures of the Likelihood Ratio tests, that are all highly
signiﬁcative.
The cost eﬃciency results indicate the existence of a wide ineﬃciency for
investment ﬁrms. The eﬃciency decreases in the period: from 0.638 (the
maximum) in year 1998 to 0.568 (the minimum) in year 2002.T h ee v o l u t i o n
over time of the eﬃciency scores have an up and down movement. Notice,
that the ﬁgure of year 1998 seems to conﬁrm the ﬁndings about Italian ﬁrms
for the period 1995 − 1998 reported in Beccalli (2003).16
In table 4 we partition the set of all ﬁrms according to their size into
ﬁve classes in order to study how average cost eﬃciency of each set changes
among groups and overtime.
[insert table 4 here]
Four classes17 of ﬁrms have a similar trend in their own eﬃciency scores:
all of them show a double digit decreasing in eﬃciency. The smallest and the
largest investment ﬁrms have the large decreasing of 0,140 in the average
eﬃciency. The mean eﬃciency of the smallest investment ﬁrms (less than
1M of euro of active commissions) decreases from 0.607 in year 1998 to 0.467
in year 2002, with a minimum (0.228) in year 2000. For very large ﬁrms
16Beccalli’s (2003) work diﬀeres in the deﬁnition of ﬁrms output (she uses total earning
assets) and for the choice of the model to be tested. In particular Beccalli tests both
a half-truncated speciﬁcation and a Zi-truncated model in which Zi is a vector of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables that varies over-time. Our ﬁgure of average cost ineﬃciency for the year
1998 coincides with the ﬁgure reported in that work for the half-truncatet model and is
slightly bigger than the mean eﬃciency obtained with the truncated one.
17We understand that any dimensional classiﬁcation can be arbitrary; however, we have
chosen that classiﬁcation for which ﬁrms’ distribution across classes and years is as stable
as possible. For each class the sup belongs to the class while the inf is excluded.
9(more than 90M of euros) the mean eﬃciency declines from 0.407 in year
1999 to 0.267 in year 2002, the miminum of the period. For large investment
ﬁrms (30 − 90M of euros) eﬃciency declines from 0.689 (1998) to 0.583
(2002) and standard deviation increases from 0.234 (1998) to 0.321 (2002)
putting in evidence an increasing diﬀormity in the performance of ﬁrms in
this class. The medium-large (from 10M to 30M of euros) ﬁrms eﬃciency
also decreases in the period, from 0.640 (1998) to 0.579 (2002), but the ﬁrms
have a more stable performance as the variation of standard deviation shows.
The medium-size ones (from 1M to 10M of euros) have a stable eﬃciency,
indeed it increases from 0.602 (1998) to 0.605 (2002), and this behavior is
common for all the ﬁrms in the class as the values of standard deviation
denote.
The reported estimation seems to suggest that the medium and the
medium-large investment ﬁrms are more able to use labour and skill to make
proﬁts or reduce losses as compared to small and very large ﬁrms.
Notice that the degree of correlation between ﬁrms’ eﬃciency and their
ranking (reported in the last column of table 3) shows that the relative eﬃ-
ciency score does not changes much over time, since it ranges from 0.723 to
0.829. Therefore, the change in eﬃciency across groups observed in table 4
seems to be due to the entry and exit of marginal ﬁrms from one group to
the other rather than a change in average eﬃciencies.
4 Ret urns t o Scop e
In this section we consider the three main components of investment ﬁrms’
intermediation activity, namely, brokerage of securities and currencies, pri-
mary market activity and asset management, aiming at analyzing whether
there are gains in eﬃciency that investment ﬁrms can exploit by oﬀering a
whole mix of activities.
10Given the results of the previous section we cannot assume that ﬁrms
are eﬃcient, i.e. operating at the optimal level (that level that maximize
product or minimize cost). Therefore, we need to distinguish between re-
turns to scope and economies of scope.18 We focus on returns to scope, i.e.,
the superadditivity of the production function and estimate it indirectly by
comparing ﬁrms’ eﬃciency, measured with respect to a single output, with
the eﬃciency measured using bundles of output. This allows us to encom-
pass in the (possible) returns to scope two sources of gains in eﬃciency: i)
improvement in resources’ allocation (i.e. input reduction) and ii) increase
in output that depends on the joint oﬀer of the product mix, such as gains
in outputs’ market value due to customers’ appreciation of the purchase of
a whole mix of products or due to the increase in output quality when some
mix of products are oﬀered.19
Three models are set to analyze scope returns between each pair of activ-
ities, namely, between brokerage and asset management (model 1), between
primary market activity and asset management (model 2) and between bro-
kerage and primary market activity (model 3).20
In each model, we follow a two-steps procedure. In step 1,w eu s eat i m e -
varying, random eﬀect, unbalanced panel data maximum likelihood speciﬁ-
cation of stochastic frontier (Battese and Coelli, 1992) to run two regressions
and obtain ﬁrms’ estimates of technical eﬃciency for each regression. The
ﬁrst one is performed taking into account data of active and passive commis-
sions accruing from just one single activity per each model, that is, brokerage
for model 1 and 3 and primary market activity for model 2; the second regres-
18See the above footnote 5.
19Notice that, on top of the argument exposed in the text, we were forced to follow the
procedure highlighted there instead of estimating a multiple-output cost function because
of a lack of data about input-speciﬁc costs and prices.
20We have not considered a fourth model in which the three activities are altogether
because of data numerosity problems. See the following footnote.
11sion is performed considering active and passive commissions derived from
the union of those two activities whose relationship is tested in each model,
namely, brokerage plus asset management in model 1, primary market activ-
ity plus asset management in model 2 and brokerage plus primary market
activity in model 3.
I ns t e pt w ow ec o m p a r e ,i ne a c hm o d e l ,t h e( d i ﬀerence from the mean of
each ﬁrms’) eﬃciency estimates obtained in the second regression over the
(mean diﬀerence of) estimates derived in the ﬁrst regression running using
OLS.
The following list summarizes the procedure followed here for the three
models.21
Summary 1 (Model 1: brokerage vs. asset management) Step 1. Two
production functions are deﬁn e dt oo b t a i ne ﬃciency estimates:
























where Qait are active commissions from brokerage of securities and curren-
cies; Kait is physical capital plus passive commissions from brokerage of se-
21The data used for models 1, 2, and 3, are not the same even when the same type of
activity is considered, since the subsets of ﬁrms that perform each couple of activity are not
equal. For instance, in model 1 we consider the subset of ﬁrms that during the observation
period performed activity of brokerage and asset management, while data about brokerage
in model 3 is referred to the subset of ﬁrms that performed activities of brokerage and
primary market activity; clearly, not all ﬁrms that in the period of observation made
brokerage of securities and currencies were active in the primary market (and the same is
true for the other couples of activities). Notice, moreover, that results of our step 2 would
not be diﬀerent if in equation 4 brokerage was replaced by asset management, and the
same is true -mutatis mutandis- for model 2 and 3.
12curities and currencies; Qbit are active commissions from brokerage of secu-
rities and currencies plus active commissions from asset management; Kbit
is physical capital plus passive commissions from brokerage of securities and
currencies plus passive commissions from asset management. Step 2. The
diﬀerence from the mean of each estimates obtained from equation 5 is re-
gressed over the diﬀerence from the mean of each estimate obtained from
equation 4:
˜ eai = µ1˜ ebi + εi (6)
where ˜ eai =( eai − ¯ eai) is the diﬀerence from the mean of ﬁrm’s i eﬃciency
estimated in equation 4 by means of equation 2 (and similarly for ˜ ebi); µ1 is
the estimand and εi is a N ∼ (0,σ2) error.
Summary 2 (Model 2: primary market activity vs. asset management)
Step 1. Two production functions are deﬁn e dt oo b t a i ne ﬃciency estimates:
























where Qcit are active commissions from primary market activity; Kcit is phys-
ical capital22; Qdit are active commissions from primary market activity plus
active commissions from asset management; Kdit is physical capital plus pas-
sive commissions from asset management. Step 2. The diﬀerence from
the mean of each estimates obtained from equation 8 is regressed over the
diﬀerence from the mean of each estimate obtained from equation 7:
˜ eci = µ2˜ edi + ui (9)
where ˜ eci =( eci − ¯ eci) is the diﬀerence from the mean of ﬁrm’s i eﬃciency
estimated in equation 7 by means of equation 2 (and similarly for ˜ edi); µ2 is
the estimand and ui is a N ∼ (0,σ2) error.
22There are no passive commissions from primary market activity.
13Summary 3 (Model 3: brokerage vs. primary market activity) Step
1. Two production functions are deﬁn e dt oo b t a i ne ﬃciency estimates:
























where Qeit are active commissions from brokerage of securities and curren-
cies; Keit is physical capital plus passive commissions from brokerage of se-
curities and currencies; Qfit are active commissions from brokerage of secu-
rities and currencies plus active commissions from primary market activity;
Kfit is physical capital plus passive commissions from brokerage of securities
and currencies. Step 2. The diﬀerence from the mean of each estimates
obtained from equation 11 is regressed over the diﬀerence from the mean of
each estimate obtained from equation 10:
˜ eei = µ3˜ efi + ui (12)
where ˜ eei =( eei − ¯ eei) is the diﬀerence from the mean of ﬁrm’s i eﬃciency
estimated in equation 10 by means of equation 2 (and similarly for ˜ efi); µ2
is the estimand and ui is a N ∼ (0,σ 2) error.
Returns to scope can be analyzed studying the sign and the signiﬁcativity
level of µi,i ∈ (1,2,3). More precisely, the null hypothesis Ho : µi =1
corresponds to the case of no returns to scope, given that there would be an
additive production function. For instance, in model one we would have that
˜ eai =˜ ebi + ui, which means that there is no signiﬁc a t i v eg a i ni ne ﬃciency
from grouping activities of brokerage with asset management (and similarly
for model 2 and 3). The sign of µi shows whether there are gains in eﬃciency
(i.e. positive returns to scope) or negative returns to scope (production
14subadditivity). The results are reported in Table 5.23
[Insert tables 5 here]
It shows that there exist (moderate) returns to scope only between pri-
mary market activity and asset management (µi =1 .163). On the con-
trary there exist negative returns to scope between brokerage and asset man-
agement (µi =0 .778) and between brokerage and primary market activity
(µi =0 .681). These outcomes put in evidence that only in one case the
investment ﬁrms ﬁnd (slightly) proﬁtable to manage jointly more than one
activity, namely, the the primary market one and the asset management one.
Generally, it would be preferable to externalize these activities and focus on
t h ec o r eb u s i n e s s .
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper the eﬃciency of Italian investment ﬁr m si se s t i m a t e db yu s i n g
the stochastic frontier function method during the period 1998 − 2002.I ti s
shown that the average eﬃciency is around 62% for years 1998-2002. Pas-
sive commissions play a relevant role in explaining the ineﬃciency of Italian
investment ﬁrms since they show an increasing trend, larger than the other
costs. On the contrary the trend of active commissions had been increasing
until year 2000 and it decreased in the following years. In year 2002,a c t i v e
commissions are only two third of their amount in year 2000.
We ﬁnd that ineﬃciency appears to be larger for the small and very
large ﬁrms and decreasing from the large to the medium ones. It seems that
all the medium investment ﬁrms have a virtuous skill to face the markets.
As a consequence, it is possible to deduce that eﬃciency does not depends
mainly from size but from diﬀerent character of ﬁrms, such as some exoge-
23The data we used for each panel are: 37 ﬁrms, 112 observations for model 1; 32 ﬁrms,
96 observations for model 2; 46 ﬁrms, 152 observations for model 3.
15nous environmental variables.24 We estimate returns to scope and ﬁnd that
they arise only between asset management and primary market activity; yet
they are modest. Returns to scope do not emerge between other investment
ﬁrms’ activities; these, on the contrary, show negative impacts on the joint
eﬃciency when brokerage is considered (i.e., negative returns to scope be-
tween brokerage and primary market activity and between brokerage and
asset management).
Summing up, it appears that Italian investment ﬁrms are facing a critical
time in which they have to increase their eﬃciency by increasing revenues and
reducing costs (mainly cost of passive commissions). The existence of returns
to scope only between two speciﬁc activities and negative returns to scope
between brokerage with the other activities seems to suggest that investment
ﬁrms can better gain eﬃciency by inducing a higher level of specialization
among them, creating niche markets and focusing on their speciﬁc skills.
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mean  median s.dev. γ LR µ eff-ranking (*)
1998 0,638 0,641 0,220 0,999 9,89 0,24 -
1999 0,653 0,663 0,195 0,970 6,12 -2,57 0,723
2000 0,574 0,598 0,253 0,995 4,97 -3,83 0,822
2001 0,670 0,735 0,186 0,960 4,16 -2,33 0,718
2002 0,568 0,562 0,268 0,999 10,94 -0,29 0,829
Observations: 48 in 1998; 54 in 1999; 41 in 2000; 49 in 2001; 50 in 2002

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































µi s.e. test: µi =1 test: 
mod.1 0,778 0,070 *** ** = rejected at 95 % conf. int. 
mod.2 1,163 0,066 ** *** = rejected at 99 % conf. int. 
mod.3 0,681 0,090 ***
model1: Eai=µ1Ebi+ui 
Eai=Eff obs i, model 1, comm. from brokerage of securities and currencies
Ebi=Eff obs i,  model 1, comm. from brokerage of securities and currencies + asset mangement
Panel: 112 observations, 37 firms.
model2: Eci=µ2Edi+ui
Eci=Eff obs i, model 2, comm. from primary market activity
Edi=Eff obs i, model 2, i.e.,  comm. from primary market activity + asset management.
Panel: 96 observations, 32 firms.
model3: Eei=µ3Efi+ui 
Eei=Eff obs i, model 3, i.e., comm from brokerage of securities and currencies
Efi=Eff obs i, model 3, comm. from brokerage of securities and currencies + primary market activity.
Panel: 152 observations, 46 firms.
notice: all parameters are to be intended as differencies from the mean
Table 5  
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